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SOON after the first workmen's compensation acts were passed, courts were
forced to consider the extraterritorial application of the statutes. The problem
is still troublesome. In the most commonly recurring situation, a worker
employed in one state is injured while working temporarily in another. Should
the compensation act of the state of injury be applied or the act of the state
of employment or both or neither? The efforts of courts to answer the ques-
tion of applicable law have produced a bewildering variety of results and a
great confusion of theoretical approaches. More recently, reciprocal exemp-
tion statutes have been enacted in an attempt to introduce some measure of
order into this disorderly field, by giving employer and employees a more
definite idea of their respective rights and duties.
THE "CHOICE-OF-LAW" PROBLEM
The extraterritorial application of compensation acts is not a choice-of-law
problem in the traditional sense. In other fields of conflict of laws, such as
tort or contract, the underlying assumption is that the law of one state applies
to the exclusion of the other. The forum looks for a choice-of-law rule that
will direct it to the internal law of one of the two or more states which have
contacts with the case. This internal law will then be applied whether it is
the law of the forum or of some other state.' In the workmen's compensation
area, nearly all courts follow a different approach. For practical reasons, the
forum does not apply the compensation act of any other state. It either applies
its own compensation act or dismisses the case.
2
Despite this specialized treatment, the analysis of many compensation cases
follows the classic choice-of-law pattern. Thus, courts often classify the case
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1. The standard process is described in detail in Hogan, Constitutional Implications
of Workmen's Compensation and Choice of Law, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 268 (1956), credit-
ing the analysis t9 Professor Lorenzen. See also ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE
CoNFLICT OF LAws c. 1 (1940).
2. See Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S.W. 762 (1926); MAT-
HEws, THE EmPLOYMENT RELATION AND TiE LAW 338 (1957); STuJmBERG, COwNLrcT
OF LAWS 223 (2d ed. 1951); 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 84.20 (1952)
(hereinafter cited as LARSON). A few statutes prescribe an opposite view. See, e.g.,
ARiz. CODE ANN. § 23-904 (Supp. 1954); HAWAII REV. LAws § 97-8 (1955); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 72-615 (Supp. 1957); VT. STAT. § 8074 (1947). And Mississippi has en-
forced the Louisiana compensation act in the absence of statute.
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according to certain accepted categories and find the appropriate connecting
factor which fits the category selected. Most likely, this method stems from
the original assumption that compensation cases could be fitted into one of
the recognized categories, either tort or contract. If tort were chosen, the
connecting factor would be the locus of the injury.3 The compensation act of
the state of injury, and no other, would govern the case. If the contract
category were selected, greater flexibility was possible. The court might use
either the place the contract was made or the place of performance, or which-
ever of these was chosen by the parties as the connecting factor.
4
But the unsatisfactory nature of either the contract or tort approach soon
became apparent.5 Liability for compensation depends upon a combination of
the employment status, created by contract, and the occurrence of an injury,
not necessarily the result of any fault of the employer. On theoretical grounds,
the treatment of compensation cases as either tort or contract is therefore
unsound. Exclusive classification is also practically undesirable because it
limits too narrowly the application of the statute. If the state of injury were
to adopt the contract approach and the state of the contract were to adhere to
the tort approach, neither statute would apply and the claimant would go
uncompensated.
To remedy this situation, courts developed the idea that workmen's com-
pensation cases should be placed in a category of their own, and a new con-
necting factor applied to this category. In Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n,6 the connecting factor was said to be the location of the "em-
ployment status." So long as this status was located in Wisconsin, the com-
pensation act of that state would apply, even though the injury occurred, and
all of the employee's services were to'be rendered, outside the state. The
location of the employment status, however, contributes little or nothing to a
solution of the problem. It only provides another example of what has been
called "reification"-the vice of treating an abstract legal relationship as a
physical object and then attempting to locate that object in space. Of course,
a status does not actually exist in any particular spot. Under the cover of this
facile verbalization, the courts are actually looking at the various contacts
which a workmen's compensation case has with the forum and deciding which
particular contacts or combination of contacts will justify the exercise of legis-
lative jurisdiction.
7
3. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913); 2 LARSON § 87.21. The rule
of the Gould case was changed by statute in Massachusetts. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 152,
§ 26B (Supp. 1957).
4. CHEATHm, GOODacH, GRiSwOLD & REESE, CONFLICr OF LAWS 476 n.2 (4th ed.
1,957).
5. Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930).
6. Ibid.
7. See Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021
(1920); Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9, 119 N.E. 878 (1918); Fay v.
Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 1.14 P.2d 508 (1941); Perfect Seal Rock Wool Mfg.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 257 Wis. 133, 42 N.W.2d 449 (1950); Val Blatz Brewing
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Regardless of theory, the actual process used by the courts is best described
as the multiplication-of-contacts method.' In the Val Blatz case, the result was
based on a feeling that the combination of domicile, place of making of the
contract and principle focus of the employer's activities furnished a sufficient
basis for the application of the Wisconsin compensation act, although all of
the employee's services were to be rendered outside that state and the injury
also occurred outside the forum. More generally, the contacts usually con-
sidered important are the place of injury, the place of making of the con-
tract, the place where the services are to be performed, the principal focus
of the employer's activities and the domicile of the employee.9 Furthermore,
if the parties designate a state law to govern the liability of the employer.
this designation is sometimes regarded as an additional contact point and
may be determinative.?°
Probably no two states agree exactly about the combination of contacts to
be used. One possible view is that the local statute will apply when any one
of these contact points is present, but no state seems to have gone this far.
In some states, jurisdiction may exist when a specific single contact exists,
such as the locus of the injury or the place of making of the contract. Many
of the decisions, however, emphasize the presence of two or more of these
contact points."
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
In applying their own workmen's compensation acts, state courts are con-
fronted with important constitutional restrictions on legislative jurisdiction
which have long been taken for granted. The interstate commerce clause,
12
for example, clearly prevents a state from extending its compensation act
into that part of the commerce field which Congress has pre-empted. Workers
on interstate railroads, 13 shamen, 14 harbor workers and longshoremen 15 are
among those employees whose coverage under state statutes is curtailed. So
far, Congress has not acted with respect to employees of interstate bus lines 16
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930). Larson favors this test
but concedes the difficulties in its application. 2 LARsON § 87.41.
8. Cowan, Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's Compensation Laws-A Sug-
gested Solution, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 917 (1955).
9. See ibid.
10. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLum. L. REV.
1072 (1953), takes the position that the law chosen by the parties should be given effect
only in the case of negotiated contracts. ,
1.1. In Daniels v. Trailer Transp. Co., 327 Mich. 525, 42 N.W.2d 828 (1950), five
different states had contacts with the case.
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
88 51-60 (1952).
14. 'Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
15. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927),
as amended, 33 U.S.C. Vs 901-50 (1952).
16. See Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528 (1956).
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or airlines,17 so that a state, if it chooses, may apply its own compensation
act.
For present purposes, the important provisions of the Constitution are the
due process ' and full faith and credit clauses. 19 In spite of the extensive
discussions of this matter, the United States Supreme Court has never held
directly that a state may not apply its own workmen's compensation act in
a conflicts situation. In the key case, Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,
20
the Supreme Court merely held that the state of injury could not apply its
statutory tort law because to do so would deny full faith and credit to a pro-
vision of the state with the dominant contacts that the remedy under its
workmen's compensation act should be exclusive. Admittedly, the case reason-
ably indicates that the state of injury could not have applied its own work-
men's compensation act if it had chosen to do so, and the case has been cited
ever since in support of that proposition.
Workmen's compensation, however, is not a field to which the public acts
provision of the full faith and credit clause should ever have been applied.
This provision has usually been confined to three types of cases: where the
forum has no substantial contact with the case ;21 where the interest of the
forum is slight in comparison with that of the dominant state ;22 and where
the interest of the forum is substantial, but the need for uniform treatment
of the members of an association outweighs the policy of respecting the
forum's interest.23 Workmen's compensation does not fit any of these cate-
gories, although Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Clapper, thought it could be in-
cluded in the second class.
2 4
In the years following the Clapper decision, the Court has steadily retreated
from its holding. The concept of exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the state
of the dominant interest has given way to the idea of concurrent legislative
17. See Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
18. U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the due process clause has been argued
in the workmen's compensation cases, no Supreme Court decision has restricted the extra-
territorial application of a state compensation act on this ground. The argument of due
process was made unsuccessfully in Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). In Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947),
application of the District of Columbia workmen's compensation act to an injury suffered
in Virginia by an employee whose principal employment was in Virginia was held not
to violate due process of law.
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
20. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
21. Such a case is not likely to arise in practice. The forum may have a policy
against enforcing the statute of a sister state but is not apt to apply it unless it has some
more substantial contact.
22. First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951).
23. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sover-
eign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938).
24. 286 U.S. 145, 156-59 (1932).
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jurisdiction in each state having a substantial interest.25 In Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commn'n 6,2  the Court upheld the power of the
state of injury to apply its own statute in a factual situation indistinguish-
able from the Clapper case. And the final blow to the doctrine of exclusive
legislative jurisdiction came in Carroll v. Lanza,27 where the state of injury
was permitted to apply its own tort law although the plaintiff was covered
by the compensation act of the state of the contract. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, pointed out that this holding, in effect, overruled the Clapper
case. The majority was content to state that the Pacific Employers case
"departed" from the Clapper decision. Even before Carroll v. Lanza, a dis-
tinguished authority took the position that a state could apply its workmen's
compensation act whenever it had a substantial interest, unhampered by
either the due process or full faith and credit clause.28 Since Carroll v. Lanza,
the correctness of this position is open to little doubt.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
The foregoing discussion reveals a confused pattern of overlapping juris-
diction and conflicting choice-of-law rules, with the United States Supreme
Court almost completely abdicating its normal function of minimizing the
conflict of state rules. 29 Sometimes, the employee is caught without a right
to compensation under the law of any state.3 0 More often, he has a choice of
filing his claim in any one of two or more jurisdictions. The employer may
have to face claims in a number of states and has the problem of obtaining
sufficient insurance protection.3 '
25. 2 LARSON § 86.20. Laison's black-letter rule is stated in terms directly contra-
dicting the Clapper case.
26. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
27. 349 U.S. 408 (1955). There has been extensive re-examination of the constitu-
tional problem since Carroll v. Lanza. Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense of
Full Faith and Credit to Workinens CompenSation Acts, 41 IowA L. REV. 558 (1956);
Langschmidt, Choice of Law in Workmen.'s Compensation, 24 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1956) ;
Hogan, supra note 1; Clark, Work-Injuries and the Constitution: Carroll v. Lanza, 1956
WAs H. U.L.Q. 320.
Good discussions of the constitutional problems as it stood before Carroll v. Lauza
are found in 2 LARSON § 86; Wellen, Workmen's Compensation Law, Cowflict of Laws
and the Constitution, 55 W. VA. L. Rav. 131, 233 (1952).
28. 2 LARSON § 86.
29. The undesirability of the existing situation is emphasized by Cowan, supra note
8, at 921. See 2 LARSON § 86.50 for references to "virtual withdrawal" of the Supreme
Court and the "undisciplined jungle" of state rules.
30. 2 id. § 87.24. In Frankel Carbon & Ribbon Co. v. Aaron, 1.13 Colo. 429, 158 P.2d
929 (1945), the Colorado court denied compensation to the dependents of an employee
who was killed in Washington under circumstances where it was quite doubtful if the
Washington compensation act would apply. See text at note 67 infra.
31. Private insurance companies are apparently willing to write policies which will
cover the employer's possible liability under the laws of two or more states. See Allen
v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 328, 340, 172 P.2d 669, 675 (1946) (dissenting opinion of
[Vol. 6: M,
RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION PROVISIONS
The existence of overlapping jurisdiction raises the problem of overlapping
awards. An employee who has received an award in one state may file an
additional claim in a second state under its compensation act. It is now gen-
erally agreed that, if an award is recovered in the second state, the amount
of the first award must be deducted and the employer only required to pay
the excess -.3 2 Thus, the practical reason for bringing a second proceeding is
to secure the additional benefits which may be available in the higher com-
pensation states, the employee having originally made the mistake of apply-
ing in a jurisdiction with a lower scale of benefits. Under some circum-
stances, the award in the first state is res judicata and bars any additional
recovery in other states.33  Othertimes, additional recovery is permissible,
particularly when the award in the first state is, in terms, without prejudice
to the right to proceed elsewhere.3 4 A distinct problem arises when the
employee who has recovered an award of compensation in one state brings
a tort action against a third person in a second state for the same injury.
This situation is not covered clearly by any decision of the United States
Supreme Court. Some cases allow recovery, permitting the plaintiff in the




Numerous solutions to the problem of confused and overlapping jurisdic-
tion have been proposed or adopted. Among these, three are especially note-
worthy-interstate compacts, uniform choice-of-law acts and reciprocal ex-
emption statutes. Before analyzing these proposals in detail, the basic policies
which underlie the willingness of the states to extend or restrict the extra-
territorial application of their compensation acts should be considered.
The two principal interests requiring protection are the social interest in
Wolfe, J.). The ,problem may be more difficult when the employer elects to come under
a state compensation fund.
32. 2 LARSON § 85.70 points out that there are certain exceptional situations in which
double recovery has been allowed.
33. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
34. See Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
35. Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934) (recovery for wrongful death
in federal court in North Carolina under Virginia wrongful death statute after compen-
sation award granted in North Carolina-recovery inures to benefit of insurance carrier
to the extent of its compensation payment) ; Drake v. Hodges, 114 Colo. 10, 161 P.2d
338 (1945) (widow recovered maximum damages for Wrongful death in Colorado after
receiving workmen's compensation in Wyoming and agreeing to reimburse the Wyoming
compensation fund out of the recovery in the tort action). No double recovery actually
occurs in either case because of the reimbursement agreements. See RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWs § 401 (Supp. 1948), and the criticism of ,this section in CHEATHAm,
GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REESE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 482 n.3 (4th ed. 1957). Compare Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
worker welfare and the social interest in taxpayer welfare.3 6 Protection of
the first requires that the employee should be compensated for his injury.
The second is promoted by insuring that the injured employee does not be-
come a public charge.37 Both interests are advanced by the policy of requir-
ing employers to bear the cost of compensating workers injured in the course
of their employment. Realistically, the cost of the necessary insurance against
liability will be treated as a business charge which will be passed along to
the ultimate consumer. And the consumer and the taxpayer are not always
the same individual, particularly in the interstate situation. For example, an
employee injured in California might become a public charge on the tax-
payers of that state. 8  If the employee recovers compensation and the em-
ployer carries insurance, the cost may very well be allocated to consumers
of the employer's product throughout the United States. Thus, the interest
of California in protecting its taxpayers differs from the usual policy of
throwing the cost of worker injuries on society as a whole.
Clearly, a state's interest in insuring that its own domiciliaries are com-
pensated for injuries is quite different from its interest in securing compen-
sation for nonresidents who are injured while temporarily employed in the
state. With respect to the first group, the primary consideration is worker
welfare. The state's interest extends not only to compensation for the worker
but to compensation at the highest level consistent with its own policy. A
high compensation state should not cede jurisdiction to a lower compensation
state when its residents are injured there.3 9 On the other hand, a high com-
pensation state does not have nearly so great an interest in nonresidents who
happen to be injured within its borders. Its concern runs no further than to
prevent such workers from becoming a public charge. If the state of injury
can be reasonably assured that such transient workers are actually covered
by the compensation laws of their home states, it can well afford to cede
jurisdiction to those states. The level of compensation in all states is high
enough to make it reasonably certain that an employee who recovers com-
pensation in one state will not become a public charge in another.
From this discussion, the general proposition arises that the state of the
worker's residence has the dominant interest and the state of injury only a
minor interest. Undoubtedly, this consideration underlay Mr. Justice Bran-
36. The most complete judicial treatment of the interests involved is found in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 419-21
(1955) ; see also Cowan, supra note 8.
37. The "public charge" aspect is implicit in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Some discussions of the problem overemphasize
this point and fail to give sufficient weight to the social interest in the protection of
workers. The state's interest goes far beyond insuring that the worker does not have to
be supported by its taxpayers.
38. Ibid.
39. Larson points out that some states impose a $6,000 limit on total permanent dis-
ability, while in other states having no limits the recovery could conceivably exceed
$100,000. 2 LARSON § 84.10.
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deis's treatment of the Clapper case. However, his attempt to solve the prob-
lem in terms of exclusive jurisdiction in the state of the dominant interest
has now broken down, since the Supreme Court has recognized that the in-
terest of the state of injury, although minor, is nevertheless sufficient to
justify extraterritorial application of the compensation act of that state.40
But the Brandeis idea is still of importance and can be given practical effect
if the state of the lesser interest is willing to cede jurisdiction in order to bring
about a more workable solution to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction
without sacrifice of its own really important interests.
Another point that seems clear is that the domicile of the worker now
emerges as the most important single contact. Why then has this factor been
so largely neglected in the actual decisions, as well as in the statutes? The
result may be traced to the traditional contract or tort approach, which
throws the emphasis on the place the contract was made or the injury sus-
tained. Another explanation may be the distrust of the domicile concept,
which requires proof of a subjective nature.41 A state's real interest is in its
genuine permanent residents, not in those transients who may claim a domi-
cile by virtue of the simple statement that they intend to make their homes
there. This uncertainty of proof may make it desirable to subordinate domi-
cile as a contact point to the place of making the contract, location of the
principal employment and the place of injury.
Nor should jurisdiction be based on domicile alone. Apart from the diffi-
culty of proof, the practical objection arises that the state will rarely have
judicial jurisdiction over the employer when the domicile of the employee is
the only contact point. The state might not be in a position to apply its com-
pensation act even if it wished to do so. For this reason, perhaps, Cowan bases
jurisdiction on domicile only when the employer's business is localized in the
forum and judicial jurisdiction is thus assured.4
Currently, the discussion seems to center about the allocation of jurisdiction
between the "home state" and the state of injury. "Home state" is some-
times defined as the state where the contract of employment is made and
sometimes as the state where the principal employment is located. Some
reciprocal statutes use these two contact points in the alternative as bases for
extraterritorial. extension of the compensation act.
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Several years ago, the suggestion was made that interstate compacts might
be used to solve the problem of overlapping jurisdiction in the compensa-
tion field. 43 This device seems to have been employed successfully in Europe,
40. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
41. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,
245 (1945), speaks of a concept "as variable and amorphous as 'donicil'" and attacks
its utility as a basis for judicial jurisdiction in divorce.
42. Cowan, supra note 8; see 2 LARsoN § 87.50.
43. Dwan, Workinees Compensation and the Conflict of Laws, 11 MINN. L. REV.
329 (1927).
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where a compact between England and France governs injuries to workers.44
Thus far, no actual compacts on workmen's compensation are in effect in
the United States. Our experience of the past thirty years with interstate
compacts indicates that many practical difficulties militate against their use
in situations in which statutes can be constitutionally employed.45 Interstate
compacts are cumbersome and require extensive negotiations. In each com-
pact, one state has to convince the other of the desirability of the particular
approach which it wishes to follow. Once the compact is in effect, it is in-
elastic and adjustments are difficult. If a state has agreed to a policy which
it later considers disadvantageous, the compact hinders any readjustment or
improvement of the situation.
A fresh impetus has been given to the use of interstate compacts in the
compensation field by the recent action of Oregon.46 In 1955, the legislature
authorized the state Industrial Accident Commission to enter into such com-
pacts with the workmen's compensation agencies of other states in situations
in which the employment contract is in one state and the injury is received
in another state and in other cases where the reach of jurisdiction of the two
states is in dispute. This statute obviously contemplates reciprocal exemption
like that provided in the reciprocal exemption statutes, but with the extent
of the exemption to be determined by the terms of the compact.
UNIFORM CHOIcE-OF-LAw ACTS
Two proposals have been put forward for the use of uniform state laws
governing the extraterritorial application of workmen's compensation acts.
These are the Model Workmen's Compensation Law 47 and a uniform choice-
of-law act, drafted by Cowan.
48
The Model Workmen's Compensation Law is not designed as a uniform
act in the usual sense of that phrase but is suggested as a model which may
be helpful to states in drafting or revising their statutes. The extraterritorial
provisions of this actf are found in section six. The connecting factor is the
44. This compact was originally attached as a schedule to the Workmen's Compen-
sation (Anglo-French Convention) Act, 1909, 9 EDW. 7, c. 16.
45. It is generally felt that the experience of Colorado with the seven-state Colorado
River Compact has not been a happy one. This agreement, made many years ago, over-
estimated the available flow of the Colorado River and has been a source of difficulty
ever since. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 STAT. 1058 (1928), 43 U.S.C. § 617c (1952),
stated that no water rights could be claimed or initiated until ratified by California and
five of six other western states-Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming. It was subsequently ratified. Colorado has passed an act implementing its duties
thereunder with regard to allocation of water between the upper and lower basin states.
CoLo. Rzv. STAT. AxN. § 148-8-1 to -6 (Supp. 1957).
46. ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.126(4) (1955).
47. 'Model Workmen's Compensation Law § 6 (1955), prepared by the U.S. Dep't
of Labor, released Nov. 1955, BNA Daily Lab. Rep. Special Supp. No. 33 (Dec. 6,
1955).
48. Cowan, supra note 8, at 922-24.
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carrying on of employment in the state, and the act applies regardless of
the place of injury. The statutory definition of "carrying on employment"
includes all cases where the contract is made within the state as well as those
in which the contract is made elsewhere for employment within the state.
The problem of overlapping awards is handled by a provision amounting to
an election of remedies. When the claimant has been awarded compensation
or has entered into an agreement for compensation approved by proper
authority in another state, he comes exclusively under the coverage of the
compensation law of that state and is entitled to no benefits under the com-
pensation act of the forum. No direct provision bars a tort action in the
forum, however.
The Cowan proposal for a uniform act is much more complex and is based
on the multiplication-of-contacts theory. The statute of the forum applies in
three distinct situations: where the forum is the state of domicile of the em-
ployee and also the place where the employer's business is localized; where
any three of the five important connecting factors are present in the forum;
and where the employee is not otherwise covered by any compensation act
and the employer's business is localized within the state.
The five contacts relevant to the second situation are roughly the same as
those previously mentioned in this Article. The phrase "business localized
within the state' 40 is arbitrarily defined: if sixty per cent of the employees
are normally employed within its limits, a state becomes the state of locali-
zation. If no such state exists, the employer is considered to have a business
localized in every state in which he is authorized to do business. The em-
ployee's "principal place of work" is also given an arbitrary definition: the
state where the employee has actually worked, or has contracted to work,
for a period of nine months or more.
An example may show how this rather complex scheme works out in
practice. Suppose that Texas has adopted the proposed act. An employee
who has been injured in Texas wishes to know whether his claim can be filed
in that state. The fact that Texas is the place of injury is not enough; fur-
ther contacts must be sought. The first questions are where the employee is
domiciled, whether the employer has qualified to do business in Texas and
whether the employer's principal focus is outside the state. If Texas domicile
coincides with business focus in Texas, no further inquiry is necessary. The
employee is covered by the Texas act. If either of these factors is missing,
attention must be given to the five contact points, any three of which must
be present. Thus, if Texas is the domicile of the employee, the state of in-
jury and the state where the employee's principal services were to be ren-
dered, the employee again is covered although no business focus is in the
state and the contract of employment was made outside Texas.
Section (c) of the Cowan proposal is a "catch-all" provision, designed to
pick up the case of any employee whose claim might otherwise be lost in the
49. In this Article the term "business focus" is used as a short synonym for this
phrase.
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
shuffle. As previously suggested, the state of domicile has an interest in in-
suring that its residents do not go uncompensated, and a possibility of re-
strictive interpretation always exists, which might leave cases uncovered by
the law of any state. Section (c) is intended to avoid that possibility.
Cowan also has a lengthy provision directed to minimizing the cases of
overlapping awards. His proposed statute makes the award in the first state
res judicata in the second state if a certain procedure is followed. The em-
ployer is required to file with the Commission in the first state a statement
showing the principal contact points and, whenever relevant, must notify the
employee that he has the election to file his claim in one of two or more
states. These requirements are designed to avoid the situation apparently
present in the Magnolia case, where the employee injured in Texas agreed
to accept the full compensation available in that state, not knowing that he
could obtain higher compensation in Louisiana.rO
Compared with the Model Workmen's Compensation Law, the Cowan pro-
posal places great emphasis on domicile. This factor is only indirectly men-
tioned in the Model Law, in the general statement of intention to provide a
remedy for residents of the state. Also, Cowan's phrase "business localized
in the state," with its exact definition, should be compared with the wording
"employer who carries on any employment in this state," found in the Model
Law.
Neither of these proposals makes any attempt to solve the problem of over-
lapping jurisdiction, as distinct from the problem of overlapping awards. The
assumption seems to be that broad extraterritorial coverage is desirable and
that the resulting overlapping jurisdiction is a more or less necessary evil.
What the two proposals do accomplish is to bring some degree of uniformity
into the conflicting choice-of-law rules found under existing law. But the
reciprocal exemption statutes offer a superior solution to overlapping juris-
diction. Their operation challenges the continuing existence of this problem.
RECIPROCAL 1EXEMPTION STATUTES
Reciprocal exemption statutes are based on the theory that the state of in-
jury, having the lesser interest, can afford to cede jurisdiction to the state
with the dominant interest, usually the state where the contract is made or
where the principal employment is located. As suggested earlier, the state
of the employee's domicile has the strongest interest of all, but the statutes
have generally ignored this factor. In most cases, however, domicile will prob-
ably coincide with the state in which the contract is made.
50. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 450 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
No provision governs overlapping awards in the reciprocal exemption statutes. Probably,
the smaller number of cases of overlapping jurisdiction in states which adopt these
statutes will make the problem of overlapping awards a minor one.
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Reciprocal exemption statutes have been enacted in eleven states.5 In ten
of these, provisions for extraterritorial extension of the statute of the forum
are combined with provisions exempting out-of-state employers from liability,
under the forum's statute, to employees temporarily working in the forum.
Both types of provisions are reasonably necessary to a satisfactory scheme of
reciprocal exemption. State X should be willing to exempt employers who have
made contracts in state Y only if state X can be sure that the employee who
is injured in X is actually covered by the compensation act of Y. If state Y
has a statute containing extension provisions, state X will be satisfied on this
point. Therefore, both states must have extension provisions to justify ex-
emption and insure complete reciprocity. Of course, these extension pro-
visions need not be in the exemption statute itself. A state may make its act
applicable to injuries suffered beyond its borders by other statutory enact-
ment or by judicial interpretation. Most states, however, seem to feel that
the situation is clarified if the extension provisions are combined directly
with the exemption provisions in consecutive sections of the statute.
The extension provisions are not enacted solely to secure reciprocity. When
a state gives up its jurisdiction over out-of-state workers injured within its
territory, it is recognizing the dominance of the state of contract or principal
employment and should therefore assert its own jurisdiction in cases where
it is the dominant state. A typical exemption statute is found in California:
"§ 3600.5 .... (b) Any employee who has been hired outside of this
State and his employer shall be exempted from the provisions of this
division while such employee is temporarily within this State doing work
for his employer if such employer has furnished workmen's compensa-
tion insurance coverage under the workmen's compensation insurance or
similar laws of a state other than California, so as to cover such em-
ployee's employment while in this State; provided, the extraterritorial
51. The following states combine reciprocal exemption provisions with provisions
for extraterritorial extension of the statute of the forum: CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600.5;
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-16-1 to -5 (Supp. 1955) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(3)
(1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-55 (Supp. 1956); NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.260 (1956);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-10-42, 59-1043 (Supp. 1957); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 65-0801,
65-0802 (Supp. 1949) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-54, 35-1-55 (Supp. 1957) ; Wyo. Comp.
STAT. ANN. §§ 72-301, 72-302, 72-313 (Supp. 1957).
Ohio has provisions for extraterritorial extension but only when the parties have
agreed that the compensation act shall apply and the agreement is filed with the Indus-
trial Commission of Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54 (Page Supp. 1957).
Rhode Island has adopted a reciprocal exemption statute which has no provision for
extraterritorial extension. Public Laws of R.I. 1941, c. 1052, § 1 (amending R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 300 (1938)). This omission is probably due to the fact that the Rhode
Island courts had previously held that their statute applies whenever the contract is made
in Rhode Island. Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916).
South Dakota has a broad provision for reciprocity without a direct provision for
exemption. S.D. CODE § 64.0113 (Supp. 1952).
Oregon has no reciprocal exemption statute but authorizes the State Industrial Acci-
dent Commission to enter into agreements with other states relating to conflict of juris-
dictions. OR. REv. STAT. § 656.126(4) (1955).
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provisions of this division are recognized in such other state and provided
employers and employees who are covered in this State are likewise
exempted from the application of the workmen's compensation insurance
or similar laws of such other state. The benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Insurance Act or similar laws of such other state, or other
remedies under such act or such laws, shall be the exclusive remedy
against such employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not,
received by such employee while working for such employer in this State.
"A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission or similar department of another state certifying that
the employer of such other state is insured therein and has provided
extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working within
this State shall be prima facie evidence that such employer carries such
workmen's compensation insurance.1
5 2
The ten other states with reciprocal exemption statutes have substantially
similar provisions. Several key phrases should be noted. The phrase "hired
outside of this state" sets one of the limits on the class of employees ex-
empted. If an Ohio employer sends one of his regular employees, hired under
a contract made in Cleveland, to Los Angeles on a job which will require a
week or so to complete, the employee meets the qualification "hired outside
of this state" under the California statute. He also meets the second quali-
fication "temporarily within this state." For the California exemption to
apply, however, further qualifications must be met. The Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act must cover this employee while he is in California. The
employer must carry compensation insurance covering his liability under the
Ohio statute. And Ohio must have a reciprocal statute exempting California
employers in the converse situation-in fact the case.
Two situations may illustrate the limits of the statute. If the Ohio em-
ployer hires an employee in Cleveland for a job which will require several
months to complete and which is to be performed entirely in California,
exemption from coverage under the California statute is not clear. The phrase
"temporarily within this state" obviously sets some time limit on the appli-
cability of the exemption. One may hazard a guess that this employee would
not qualify for the exemption. Again, if the Ohio employer hires an employee
in Los Angeles for a job which is to be performed principally in California
but requires some temporary services in Ohio, this employee clearly fails to
qualify for the exemption in California. Perhaps the more relevant inquiry,
however, is into the applicability of the Ohio exemption. For the employee is
likely to be domiciled in California.
In these illustrations, the employee may or may not be covered by the
Ohio statute. If he is covered by both the Ohio and California statutes and
the necessary conditions for exemption under either do not exist, a case of
overlapping jurisdiction arises. Since the main purpose of exemption statutes
is to prevent such overlapping, a nondomiciliary court should interpret the
52. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600.5(b).
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exemption provisions to apply to as many cases as possible, consistently with
the express statutory limits, if assured of the employee's coverage in his
domiciliary state. In this fashion, the policy of prevention of overlapping can
be harmonized with preservation of the dominant state's interest in insuring
that its citizens are compensated. Thus, it might be well to consider an em-
ployee to be "temporarily within this state," even though he may have been
present for several months. The court in the domiciliary state, on the other
hand, might be well advised to construe its exemption provision narrowly.
The phrase "hired outside of this state," for example, might be interpreted
to have no application to a citizen whose employment relation in the foreign
jurisdiction did not exceed a job interview and the signing of a contract.
More precisely, a California court considering the case of a California citizen
who was interviewed and hired in Ohio for work which was to be performed
in California might want to exercise jurisdiction since California is the domi-
nant state. Conversely, the Ohio court in this circumstance would construe
its "hired outside of this state" exemption to encompass nonresident em-
ployees hired in the state for work to be performed in the state of their domi-
cile.
The statute also requires certain steps of the Ohio employer who plans to
send one of his regular employees to California on a temporary job and
wishes to take advantage of the California exemption. He should make sure
that the Ohio statute will cover this employee while he is in California 5
and that his workmen's compensation insurance will cover any liability to this
employee under the Ohio act while the employee is in California, taking out
additional insurance if necessary. Beyond these general precautions, more
specific steps are desirable. The employer should procure a certificate from
the Industrial Commission of Ohio certifying that such insurance is in effect
and forward this certificate to the California Industrial Accident Commis-
sion.
A question of great importance to employers is whether the procurement
of the certificate of insurance is a necessary condition to the application of
the exemption. The statute itself does not so provide; it merely states that
the certificate shall be prima facie evidence that the employer carries com-
pensation insurance. Courts interpreting such provisions in exemption statutes
should not raise a desirable evidentiary aid to the dignity of a necessary pre-
condition. The area abounds in complications without the addition of un-
necessary technicalities. An employer should be free to procure and produce
a certificate after the injury 54 or to prove coverage by any other available
53. The unusual extension provisions of the Ohio Act, OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.54
(Page Supp. 1957), render this task more difficult than necessary. Extraterritorial cover-
age is only granted when an agreement in writing between employer and employee to
such coverage has been filed with the industrial commission.
54. The only case in which the certificate was procured and filed after the injury was
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Howington, 133 Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1956). The
point directly involved in this case was the provision for the extraterritorial application of
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evidence. A distinction should be drawn between the steps an employer is
legally required to take and those which it is advisable for him to take."'
EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSION PROVISIONS
The theory of reciprocal exemption is that the "home state" has the
dominant interest and the state of injury the minor interest. This theory is
made practically effective by a statute which asserts the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the home state as well as exempts injured casual workers. Most
of the statutes are drawn along these lines and contain specific extension
provisions.
The California extension statute is again typical:
"§ 3600.5 .... (a) If an employee who has been hired or is regularly
employed in this State receives personal injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of such employment outside of this State, he, or
his dependents in case of his death, shall be entitled to compensation
according to the law of this State."5 6
This section recognizes the dominance of the home state and uses as alter-
native bases for extension the contact points of hiring within the state or
regular employment within the state. In contrast is the language of the ex-
emption statutes, which adopts "hiring outside of the state" as the basis
without mention of the location of the regular employment. Because the in-
terest of the dominant state may require narrow construction of the "hired
outside of this state" provision in the exemption statute, the regular employ-
ment provision should be utilized for exemption as well as extension. Statu-
tory amendment to this effect would obviate difficulties of construction and
promote harmony between the elimination of overlapping jurisdiction and
the recognition of the dominant state's interest in its own citizens. In other
respects, the exemption and extension provisions fit together to form a con-
sistent pattern, the forum asserting its jurisdiction whenever it is the home
state and ceding jurisdiction whenever it is merely the state of injury. This
cession of jurisdiction is accomplished by the clause in the reciprocal exemp-
tion statutes providing that the benefits of the statute of the other state shall
be the exclusive remedy when the conditions for exemption exist.
the act of the state of hiring. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-16-3 (Supp. 1957). The State
Compensation Fund took the position that neither the extension nor the exemption pro-
visions of this statute took effect until the certificate had been procured and filed. On
this basis, the Industrial Commission denied the claim. The Su~preme Court of Colorado,
however, held that both the extension and the exemption provisions took effect from the
time the insurance was procured.
55. In reply to a questionnaire submitted by the authors, the Utah Industrial Com-
mission stated definitely that the exemption is effective from the time the insurance is
procured, indicating that procuring the certificate is not a condition of the exemption.
The Wyoming Commission interprets the submission of a certificate as a prerequisite to
exemption.
56. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600.5
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One problem that has concerned the legislatures relates to the time element.
While the exemption provisions are limited to employees temporarily within
the state, no corresponding limitation is to be found in the extension pro-
visions. It is probably undesirable to extend the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the home state to employees working permanently outside the state. Ap-
parently recognizing this problem, Mississippi specifically provides an ex-
ception in the case of employees whose departure from the state is caused
by a permanent assignment or transfer.57 Some other states employ a six-
month clause: after any employee has been absent from the state for more
than six months, he is no longer subject to the local act unless the employer
files a certificate with the Industrial Commission extending his liability.58
EXPERIENCE WITH THE STATUTES
Only a few cases interpreting reciprocal exemption statutes have reached
the appellate courts. One of these cases is directly concerned with the exemp-
tion provisions, while the others determine the extent of extraterritorial
coverage under the extension provisions.
In LaDew v. LaBorde,59 a resident of Louisiana made a contract of em-
ployment with an employer living in Texas whose business extended over
Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. The contract was made in Texas, and the
principal place of employment was Louisiana. The employee suffered a heart
attack in Mississippi, where he was working on a job which was apparently
temporary. However, the employer had obtained compensation insurance
under the Mississippi law for coverage of employees in that state and had
paid premiums which were based on the wages of the particular employee
while working in Mississippi. The employer claimed exemption under the
provisions of the Mississippi statute,60 since the employee was hired outside
of Mississippi. The court held that the exemption did not apply because
Louisiana had no reciprocal statute. No evidence before the court showed
that the employer carried compensation insurance on this particular employee
57. MNIISS. CODE ANN. § 6998-55(b) (Supp. 1956). This clause was construed in
Winborn v. R. B. Tyler Co., 94 So. 2d 340 (Miss. 1957). The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi gave a restrictive interpretation to the word '"permanent," applying the Mississippi
statute to an injury in Louisiana where all work in Mississippi had ceased and the
employee was transferred to a project of limited duration in Louisiara. See also Wvo.
Comp. STAT. ANN. § 72-301 (Supp. 1957) for similar provision.
58. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-16-3 (Supp. 1957) ; Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 6998-55(a),
(b) (Supp. 1956) (not applicable in case of a permanent assignment or transfer) ; NM.
STAT. ANN. § 59-10-42 (,Supp. 1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-54 (Supp. 1957); Wvo.
Comp. STAT. ANN. § 72-301 (Supp. 1957).
Maryland, which does not have the six-month clause, provides for extraterritorial
extension in the case of "casual, occasional or incidental employment." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 67(3) (1957).
59. 216 Miss. 598, 63 So. 2d 56, vmdified on rehearing, 216 Miss. 606, 63 So. 2d
825 (1953).
60. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 6998-55(c) (Supp. 1.956).
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in Louisiana, nor was it even clear that the Louisiana compensation act
would cover him extraterritorially. Thus, even if Louisiana had a reciprocal
act, the employer might not have been exempt. It may be noted that this is
a true choice-of-law case, for Mississippi is the only state which, apart from
statute, affirmatively enforces the compensation acts of other states,61 and the
employer claimed that the Louisiana rather than the Mississippi act should
apply.
The Utah and Colorado cases dealing with the extension provisions show
how the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the "home state" has been enlarged.
In Allen v. Industrial Coinvm'n,62 an employee domiciled and hired in Utah
for a position involving work in Nevada only was injured in the latter state.
The Utah court held that its own statute applied. The statute itself is clear
enough, since it extends to situations in which Utah is either the state of
hiring or the state where the principal services were to be rendered.63 Before
the enactment of the reciprocal act, however, Utah used the concept of "loca-
tion of the employment status," interpreted as meaning the state where the
principal services were to be rendered. 64 The employer relied on the earlier
cases as an indication that the Utah statute did not cover a situation where
all services were to be performed in Nevada. The court pointed out the
changes made by the reciprocal statute.
A concurring opinion agreed on the interpretation but had some doubt
about its advisability. So far as the Allen case is concerned, Utah was surely
the state with the dominant governmental interest, since the domiciles of
both employee and employer, as well as the employer's headquarters, were in
that state. The concurring opinion pointed out that if other states had similar
statutes, overlapping jurisdiction would result. This conclusion is incorrect,
for it is the existence of similar statutes which prevents overlapping juris-
diction. At the time of decision such a problem was present, but since the
adoption of the reciprocal act by Nevada in 1955,65 the Utah employer would
be exempt in Nevada if he complied with the statute in a case like Allen v.
Industrial Cornn.
The Colorado reciprocal act received a severe blow in Frankel Carbon &
Ribbon Co. v. Aaron,6 6 an unfortunate decision which is probably no longer
law. The situation was similar to that in the Allen case. The employee was
61. Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, 173 Miss. 882, 161 So. 699 (1935); Floyd v.
Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930); 2 LAXsoN § 84.20.
62. 110 Utah 328, 172 P.2d 669 (1946).
63. UTAH CODE AurN. § 35-1-54 (Supp. 1957).
64. Fay v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 508 (1941). The Fay case
shows the undesirability of the phrase "location of the employment status." The earlier
Utah decisions treat this phrase as synonymous with "location of the principal employ-
ment," whereas in Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W.
622 (1930), the court suggested that the employment status might exist in a state where
no services were to be rendered.
65. NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.260 (1956).
66. 113 Colo. 429, 158 P.2d 929 (1945).
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domiciled and hired in Colorado as a salesman whose territory lay outside
of the state. About two years later, he was injured and died in Washington,
a state which did not have a reciprocal statute. Before the enactment of the
reciprocal act, the Colorado workmen's compensation law would not have
extended to this death, since the "judicial rule" required that substantial ser-
vices be rendered in Colorado. 67 This requirement was abolished by the
reciprocal act. A holding for the defendant company would still have been
proper under that act, because the injury took place more than six months
after the employment began and no certificate of time extension had been
filed by the employer.6 8 Ignoring this aspect, the court held for the defendant
on the ground that neither the extension nor exemption provisions had any
application when the other state involved had no reciprocal statute. The hold-
ing on the exemption provisions is clearly correct, but the statute contains
no such express requirement for the extension provisions.
In State Compensation Fund v. Howington,69 a similar situation arose, but
the other state, Utah, had a reciprocal statute 70 and the employee was in-
jured less than six months from the date of employment. These facts distin-
guish the Aaron case, and the court's decision in favor of the employee,
Howington, could be justified on these grounds alone. But the court went
further and stated that the Aaron case was overruled "as far as inconsistent
with the present holding." 7' Of course, the two cases are not inconsistent at
all, and the only reason for the dictum about overruling Aaron must have
been a desire to express dissatisfaction with its fundamental theory. How-
ington may thus be regarded as persuasive authority for application of the
extension provisions of the Colorado reciprocal act in cases where the other
state involved does not have a similar statute.
In Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman,72 the court had some difficulty
in determining where the "contract" was made. Perryman was killed in
Kansas while driving the defendant's truck. His immediate employer clearly
made the employment contract with him in Michigan. In terms, the Colorado
statute would not cover this case, since the contract was not made in Colo-
rado and the principal services were not to be rendered there. The Industrial
Commission held for the claimant on the theory that a contract between the
immediate employer and the Truck Exchange made the latter a "principal
contractor" and, as such, liable for injuries to employees of its "sub-contrac-
tor."73 The supreme court conceded that this strained interpretation of the
67. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comim'n, 99 Colo. 280, 61
P.2d 1033 (1936), 22 RocxY MT. L. REv. 77.
68. This distinction is pointed out in State Compensation Fund v. Howington, 133
Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1956).
69. Ibid.
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-55 (Supp. 1957).
71. 133 Colo. at 594, 298 P.2d at 969.
72. 134 Colo. 586, 307 P.2d 805 (1957).
73. Id. at 595-96, 307 P.2d at 81.1-12.
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principal contractor provision 74 of the Colorado compensation act was sus-
tained by earlier cases where all of the facts occurred in Colorado. It refused
to extend the doctrine, however, to cases of injury or death outside Colorado.
Moreover, the court decided that the contract between the subcontractor and
the Truck Exchange was made in Michigan. Unfortunately, the court pro-
ceeded to resuscitate the "judicial rule" which it had officially buried in the
Howington case. It stated that two out of three conditions must concur to
sustain jurisdiction-an employment contract made in Colorado, employment
in Colorado or substantial services rendered in Colorado. But only the first
or second condition is required under the express terms of the extension
provisions of the reciprocal act.
The experience of industrial commissions has been fairly extensive in some
states but quite sketchy in others, as indicated by the replies to a question-
naire sent by the authors to the commissions of all states having reciprocal
statutes. These replies indicate that employers are not sufficiently informed
about the statutes and so fail to take full advantage of the exemption pro-
visions. California notes an increasing awareness in the past year, evidenced
by a greater number of requests for exemption. The California Commission
suggests that the phrase "temporarily within the state" should be more exact-
ly defined to meet this growing demand. And the South Dakota Commission
thinks its act should be amended to conform more closely to the pattern
found in other states. Such responses suggest that the statutes are beginning
to attain the effect they seek-a clear idea of the extent of coverage and an
awareness that the statutes of the enacting states are mutually interdepend-
ent.
HOME STATE V. STATE OF INJURY
Recent discussions of the problem of overlapping jurisdiction in the com-
pensation field indicate the existence of two conflicting schools of thought.
One group favors the dominance of the "home state," as the one with the
most substantial governmental interest, while 'the other insists on preserving
the jurisdiction of the state of injury. The first group favors the adoption of
reciprocal exemption statutes. The latter wishes to retain the conflicting juris-
diction of the state of injury and suggests leaving the law as it now stands
or adopting a uniform choice-of4aw act which would recognize the concur-
rent jurisdiction of both states. This clash has been particularly noticeable
in the discussions of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on
Extraterritoriality 7- and has so far prevented any agreement on the type of
uniform extraterritorial statute which the Committee is prepared to recom-
mend or the basic principles on which that statute should be predicated.
74. COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 81-9-1 (Supp. 1957).
75. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, Buu.m No. 186, WORmxN's




Up to the present time, many of the large industrial states have been re-
luctant to adopt reciprocal exemption statutes. Some of these states have
higher compensation rates than those found in other jurisdictions. Quite
understandably, a high compensation state will be unwilling to cede jurisdic-
tion over its own residents injured in that state.7 6 Some of these states, how-
ever, may have lost sight of the difference between the interest they have in
such cases and in those involving the injury of nonresidents casually present
in the state. The social interest in individual welfare does not extend to such
nonresidents to a degree justifying the higher compensation states' rejection
of a reasonable compromise which will work out to the best advantage of all
states.
The real solution lies in the adoption by higher compensation states of
reciprocal exemption statutes which grant the exemption only in the case of
nonresident employees injured in the forum, while denying it in the case of
its own residents.77 The state's interest in preventing an injured workman
from becoming a public charge is sufficiently protected by the assurance that
the workman is covered in some state, and it is only upon this condition that
the exemption is granted at all. This proposal recognizes the legitimate claim
of a state to insure maximum compensation to its own residents and, at the
same time, indicates a workable compromise between the two conflicting
schools.
A possible objection might arise from the fear that states with reciprocal
exemption statutes in the present form might regard a statute reserving
jurisdiction over residents as not furnishing the required degree of reciprocity.
This fear will prove unfounded if judges recognize the true character of the
governmental interests involved and give a liberal meaning to the phrase
"reciprocal recognition." If any court were to hold that the proposed statute
did not qualify, the legislature of that state could easily add a provision to its
own statute reserving jurisdiction in the case of residents. Moreover, if exist-
ing statutes are, as suggested earlier, construed in a manner promoting
recognition of the interest of the dominant state, this problem should not
even arise.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS
Three proposals for reducing the conflict of jurisdiction in workmen's
compensation cases involving two or more states have been described. Each
of these proposals has some merit. Each will no doubt provoke criticism,
and substantial opposition may confront the adoption of any one of them. A
comparison of the operation of these proposals may be wise to show how each
handles the problem.
76. 2 LtmsoN § 86.33 stresses the interest of the state of residence. A table showing
the varying rates of compensation is found in id. at 522.
77. North Dakota limits the exemption to residents of other states. N.D. REv. CoDE
§ 65-0802 (Supp. 1949).
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The reciprocal statutes establish jurisdiction in the forum when it is the
state of the contract, the state of principal employment or the state of injury.
The Uniform Choice-of-Law Act, proposed by Cowan, uses a more complex
method of asserting jurisdiction where certain named contacts or combina-
tions of contacts are present in the forum. The interstate compacts assume
that the existing choice-of-law rules, which vary from state to state, may be
modified by negotiation between any two or more states entering into a com-
pact in such a way as to minimize the conflict of jurisdiction.
The method used in the reciprocal exemption statutes is the simplest of
the three. The more complex provisions of the Cowan proposal seem to be
in line with the sound approach of basing jurisdiction on the weighing of
contacts. There is some doubt, however, of the advisability of accomplishing
this end by legislative enactment instead of leaving the process of evaluation
to the courts. The very complexity of the process makes it less likely that
the legislatures of any great number of states would be willing to accept the
proposal in its exact form. That this difficulty is less apt to be encountered
in the pattern of the reciprocal exemption statutes is indicated by their
adoption in eleven jurisdictions. The attempt to solve the problem of juris-
diction by negotiation between states, culminating in interstate compacts, in-
volves the difficulties already discussed--difficulties which are likely to delay
and disturb the objective of uniformity and limitation of jurisdictional con-
flicts.
Two considerations should govern the choice between the three proposals.
The one selected must be likely to reduce significantly the problems of con-
flicting jurisdiction. And it must have features to commend it to the state
legislatures. Both considerations point to the adoption of reciprocal exemp-
tion statutes. These statutes seem better designed for the purpose desired,
and their existence in so many states provides a workable point of departure
for their enactment in other states. Nationwide adoption of reciprocal ex-
emption statutes, accordingly, seems the best solution of the difficulties result-
ing from overlapping jurisdiction and the confused state of the present
choice-of-law rules governing workmen's compensation.
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